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Abstract
This paper studies the joint business cycle dynamics of inflation, money growth,
nominal and real interest rates and the velocity of money. I extend and estimate a
standard cash and credit monetary model by adding idiosyncratic preference shocks
to cash consumption as well as a banking sector. The estimated model accounts
very well for the business cycle data, a finding that standard monetary models have
not been able to generate. I find that the quantitative performance of the model is
explained through substantial liquidity effects.
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1 Introduction
This paper explores the business cycle dynamics of nominal money growth, inflation, nom-
inal and real interest rates and the velocity of money. Accounting for the observed rela-
tionships among these variables has proved to be difficult in a variety of monetary models,
such as cash-in-advance models, models with sticky prices or with segmented markets (Ho-
drick et al. (1991), Cooley and Hansen (1995), King and Watson (1996)). In particular,
accounting for the negative correlation of inflation and nominal interest rates with nominal
money growth, for the high volatility of money velocity and the weak correlation of infla-
tion and nominal interest rates is still a challenge. Moreover, there are large and persistent
deviations of the model-predicted money-demand relationship from its counterpart in the
data.1 Certainly, a monetary model, which can successfully account for these empirical ob-
servations, would raise the confidence in the conclusions drawn from policy experiments.2
I show that it is possible to overcome these shortcomings in a model with strong liq-
uidity effects (Increases in nominal interest rates decrease real money demand and increase
real interest rates). I find that these liquidity effects imply that the estimated model can
closely match the business cycle facts that standard models have not been able to replicate.
An important assumption in the theoretical model is that households are hit by idiosyn-
cratic preference shocks, which determine their demand for money in a model with cash
and credit goods. This assumption generates a significant precautionary demand for money
and I demonstrate that it also induces strong liquidity effects.
The literature suggests that the failure of standard models can indeed be traced back
to the absence of substantial liquidity effects.3 First, without these liquidity effects, real
money and real interest rates are almost invariant with respect to monetary policy. The
1In the last 25 years, the demand-for-money relationship has become even more problematic, since the
two monetary aggregates M1 and M2 are both positively correlated with nominal interest rates in the data,
whereas this correlation is negative in the model.
2For a critique of monetary models along these line see for example Prescott (1996) in a discussion of
a sticky-price model.
3Liquidity effects also serve to address other empirical ‘puzzles’, such as the ‘equity premium puzzle’ in
Lagos (2005) and the ‘credit card debt puzzle’ in Telyukova (2007).
Fisher equation – the nominal interest rate equals the real interest rate plus the inflation
rate – then implies that inflation, money growth and nominal interest rates move almost
one-for-one in response to the observed persistent changes in nominal interest rates. Liq-
uidity effects break this linkage and can thus potentially reconcile the predictions of an
economic model with the data. Second, the lack of a strong precautionary demand for
money also explains why velocity is not volatile enough (Hodrick et al. (1991)): households
almost always hold the right amount of money to purchase the desired amount of cash
goods. Changes in nominal interest rates therefore hardly affect the decision to acquire
real balances, leaving velocity and real interest rates almost unchanged. Finally, ratio-
nalization of observed Federal Reserve monetary policy requires the existence of liquidity
effects (see Ohanian and Stockman (1995)). Along the same lines, Alvarez et al. (2001) ar-
gue that the observed practice of increasing nominal interest rates to lower inflation would
contradict the quantity theory of money in the absence of substantial liquidity effects.4
A crucial feature in this paper, which contributes to finding strong liquidity effects, is
the presence of a commercial bank (a` la Diamond and Dybvig (1983)).5 In the model,
households have to acquire money and bonds and make deposits before they learn their
individual preference shock to cash goods. The bank diversifies this risk, providing partial
insurance against this source of uncertainty. Households deposit money with the bank
before they learn the realization of their shock, but can withdraw money after the shock
realization. In equilibrium, households are willing to accept a lower real return on their
deposits if the bank allows them to withdraw more money ex-post. The bank therefore
faces a trade-off between providing more real money, which is costly because of positive
nominal interest rates, and paying a higher real return on deposits.
4In a related paper, I argue (Hagedorn (2006)) that New Keynesian models are not a candidate to
reconcile observed monetary policy with model predictions. Indeed, I show that nominal interest rates
should be uniformly lowered to implement a lower inflation target and that real interest rates are virtually
unchanged in New Keynesian models, a result consistent with the quantity theory of money, but not with
the experience during the Volcker disinflation.
5Recently, Diamond and Rajan (2006) added money to a (Diamond & Dybvig-type) banking model.
They explore complementary issues such as the interaction of monetary policy, bank credit and bank
failures from which I abstract.
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There a three reasons to add banking to the model. First, the bank’s simple trade-off
leads to strong liquidity effects of monetary policy. In response to an increase in nominal
interest rates, the bank provides households with less money, but pays a higher real re-
turn on deposits, establishing the presence of liquidity effects. These liquidity effects are
strong because the volume of liquidity and not just changes in liquidity (as in models with
money-in-the-utility) affect real interest rates. For example, an increase in the steady state
level of real money leads to lower steady state real interest rates if the volume of liquidity
matters, but has no effect if only first differences matter.6
Second, the finding that households are willing to substitute a lower real return on their
bank deposits for more money provided by the bank is useful for measuring households’
valuation of liquidity. This substitution effect reveals households’ precautionary demand
for money and thus puts discipline on the choice of the unobservable idiosyncratic shocks.
The substitution effect, together with the bank’s response to it, is consistent with the data
as it implies a negative relationship between real deposit rates and real money.
Third, adding a bank takes seriously the fact that households receive non-negligible
interest rates on their deposits, instead of adopting the standard, but counterfactual, as-
sumption that monetary aggregates (M1 or M2) are non-interest-bearing assets.
I estimate the model using the simulated method of moments and show that the model
is able to match the estimation targets simultaneously. This appears remarkable, given
that Hodrick et al. (1991) find that many moments cannot even be replicated one at a
time.
I then simulate the model to assess the quantitative properties along the same di-
mensions as in Hodrick et al. (1991). These researchers compute contemporaneous model
correlations for nominal money growth, inflation, nominal and real interest rates and veloc-
ity and compare them with their empirical counterparts. I find that the estimated model is
able to closely replicate the empirical correlations, among them the correlations of inflation,
money growth and nominal interest rates, in the data; a result that standard models have
6Interestingly, this model feature has also attracted some attention in the finance literature: the (trad-
ing) volume is associated with prices and volatility in the stock market (Cochrane (2003)).
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not been able to generate.
The model also provides some guidance for the choice of the monetary aggregates. The
theory requires a distinction between liquid assets (those with zero maturity) and illiquid
assets (those with non-zero maturity). Identifying money with liquid assets defined in this
way leads to a money-demand relationship that is well supported by the data. This find-
ing appears remarkable given that the literature on money demand has had difficulties in
identifying stable money demand relationships in U.S. data during the last 25 years (e.g.
Lucas (2000)).
Prices are assumed to be flexible here, so that the model has some shortcomings in
addressing the interaction of inflation and output, similar to the models analyzed in Cooley
and Hansen (1995). However, the New Keynesian literature has demonstrated over the last
ten years that integrating various rigidities into macroeconomic models can improve the
quantitative model performance along this dimension (Woodford (2003)).7 The same can
be expected to apply here once the same rigidities are incorporated into the model.
Another class of monetary models with flexible prices that is developed to generate liquidity
effects of monetary policy assumes that markets are segmented (for example, Alvarez et
al. (2002)). This literature finds liquidity effects that are even weaker than those in New
Keynesian models. As a result, the observed persistent changes in nominal interest rates
then lead to a strong co-movement of nominal variables, generating the above-mentioned
counterfactual implications.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is laid out in Section
2. I study the theoretical properties of this model in a simplified version, which allows for
a closed-form solution, in Section 3. The quantitative analysis is performed in Section 4,
and Section 5 concludes. All proofs are delegated to the appendix.
7A possible response to the result that New Keynesian models cannot replicate key monetary facts
would be to follow the reasoning of Woodford. He argues that monetary policy can be conducted in
a cashless economy (Woodford (2003)) and that the quantity of money is orthogonal to all variables of
interest (Woodford (2007)). However, these arguments are based on a model with large deviations between
theory and data, and the arguments of Prescott (1996) apply: such large deviations do not raise the
confidence in the author’s conclusions.
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2 The Economy
2.1 The environment
Time is discrete and the economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived agents of
measure one. Each period t ≥ 0 is divided into two distinct and successive sub-periods t1
and t2. At date t, the expected utility Vt of an agent, which is written recursively because
of the shock θ (explained below), evaluated at t1 is
Vt = Et{c1t + u(c2t ) + βθtVt+1}, (1)
where c1t is the consumption level at t1, c
2
t is the consumption level at t2 and Et denotes
expectation formed at t1. The utility function u is continuously differentiable, concave and
u(0) is normalized to 0. The discount factor β lies strictly between zero and one.
Households do not value leisure and provide one unit of divisible labor, which is the
only input into production.8 At t1, firms can transform L units of labor into z · L units of
consumption goods, which can be sold either at t1 or at t2. Both the goods market and
the labor market are competitive. Aggregate output zLt at t equals the sum of aggregate
consumption at t1 and at t2
zLt = E(c
1
t + c
2
t ) (2)
Firms use Lt1 units of labor to produce for period t1 consumption and Lt2 units of labor
to produce for period t2 consumption. The real wage rate is denoted wt and the nominal
price is Pt in both sub-periods. Households receive labor income wtLt1 at t1 and wtLt2 at
t2.
The only source of uncertainty is a liquidity shock Θt, that changes every agents’ per-
sonal rate of time preference.9 With probability p, a high shock θt = θ > 1 realizes and
makes one unit of date t goods worth 1
β·θ <
1
β
of date t + 1 goods to the agent. With
8What is crucial for tractability is linearity in either consumption or labor. Nothing would change with
quasi-linear preferences as in Hansen (1985) and in Rogerson (1988).
9This way of modeling liquidity follows Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Diamond and Rajan (2001).
Two features of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) - every period is divided into sub-periods and agents face
liquidity shocks in some but not all sub-periods - make the model similar to the framework developed
5
probability p = 1 − p a low shock θt = θ < 1 realizes and makes one unit of date t goods
worth 1
β·θ >
1
β
of date t + 1 goods to the agent. Θ has expectation one: p · θ + p · θ = 1.
Every agent learns his individual realization of Θt at sub-period t2 after trade at t1.
Each household enters period t1 with A
0
t real assets (this amount depends on a house-
hold’s history, but does not affect its decision because of linear utility). Wealth at the
beginning of t1 equals
Wt = A
0
t + wtLt1 + Tt, (3)
where wtLt1 is households’ labor income at t1 and Tt denotes the sum of taxes and profits
of the central and private banks (described below). Agents decide how much to consume
(c1t ) and they choose how many real government bonds they want to buy (B
H
t+1 ≥ 0) to
maximize utility Vt.
Households can also sign a contract with a bank. The contract stipulates that agents
transfer A1t+1 units of goods in period t1 to the bank in exchange for rtA
1
t+1 units of goods
at t+ 1. In addition, the agent can withdraw up to Mt+1 units of nominal money at t2 for
consumption (c2t ) through the use of a check or a debit card. The terms “money” or “cash”
refer here to these financial services exclusively provided by a bank and not to fiat money
only. The household’s portfolio behaves like a demand deposit with an upper bound. The
customer can show up at any time and withdraw M˜t+1 ≤ Mt+1 funds in the form of cash.
Let χt = 1 if the agent accepts the bank’s offer in period t and χt = 0 otherwise. The
household’s budget constraint is then given by
Wt = c
1
t + χtA
1
t+1 +B
H
t+1 (4)
At the beginning of t2, each household learns its individual θt. If χt = 1, agents can
withdraw m˜t+1 = M˜t+1/Pt ≤ Mt+1/Pt units of money at t2. A cash-in-advance constraint
(CIA) for consumption at t2 provides a role for money:
c2t ≤ m˜t+1. (5)
by Lagos and Wright (2005). However, the assumption in Diamond and Rajan (2001) that agents’ time
preference rates are stochastic, improves the quantitative performance significantly.
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Households receive their t2 labor income wtLt2 in the the form of cash at the end of period
t2, after the firms have collected period t2 revenues. This wage income is transferred to
their deposit, if they have one.10 Any withdrawal of money decreases the household’s bank
deposit and the repayment at t + 1 one for one. Next period’s real asset level A0t+1 then
equals
A0t+1 = χtrt(A
1
t+1 + wtLt2︸ ︷︷ ︸
At+1:=
−m˜t+1) + (1− χt) wt
pit+1
Lt2 +
Rt
pit+1
BHt+1, (6)
where pit+1 = Pt+1/Pt is the inflation rate between t and t+ 1 and Rt is the nominal return
on bonds. If agents signed a contract at t1 (χt = 1), the bank pays a real return rt on
households’ deposit A1t+1 + wtLt2 − m˜t+1, which is the sum of assets deposited at t1, A1t+1,
assets deposited at t2, wtLt2 , minus assets withdrawn at t2, m˜t+1. Let At+1 denote the
overall amount of assets deposited at t, At+1 := A
1
t+1 +wtLt2 . If agents decide not to sign a
contract (χt = 0), they carry their labor income from period t2 to the next period. Finally,
they receive their bond income Rt
pit+1
BHt+1. The time line of events so far is summarized in
Table 1.
There is only one bank which has monopoly power and can make positive profits.11 The
bank engages in two distinct types of activities, one on each side of the balance sheet. On
the asset side, the bank only buys government bonds BBt+1 ≥ 0. Since all assets are perfect
substitutes (there is no aggregate uncertainty and there are no liquidity effects on the asset
side), I can abstract from bank loans.12 On the liability side, the bank provides agents with
10Deposit-holders could opt for carrying the cash to the next period themselves. However, this is clearly
suboptimal since they would forgo a positive nominal interest rate.
11The assumption of imperfect competition - for example, banks are Cournot-Nash competitors - is
prevalent in the banking literature (Freixas and Rochet (1997), Allen and Gale (2000)). For example, it
allows interesting questions such as the effect of competition on financial stability (Allen and Gale (2000)
and Boyd and De Nicolo (2005)) to be studied. In the quantitative analysis in Section 4, I allowed for
Cournot competition (in a previous version), which as a limit case includes perfect competition, but the
estimation selected a bank with monopoly power.
12There is a straightforward way to add capital to the model to make it consistent with NIPA data.
Suppose a fraction of firms needs to be monitored at a cost c and can thus get credit from banks (who
monitor them) only. These firms’ real interest rate then equals (1 + c)R/pi > 1/β, whereas the majority of
firms pays an real interest rate of 1/β, which is unaffected by monetary policy.
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Table 1: Timing of Events.
Date t1 Date t2
1. Household starts period with A0t assets 1. The idiosyncratic shock θt realizes.
2. Receive labor income wtLt1 , 2. Household withdraws m˜t+1 money
decide how much to consume c1t and from its account.
how many bonds to buy BHt+1 ≥ 0.
3. Sign a contract with a bank (χt = 1). 3. Consume c
2
t ≤ m˜t+1
4. Transfer A1t+1 to the bank. 4. Transfer wage income wtLt2 from t2 to the bank
A0t : Assets at beginning of period t A
1
t+1 : Assets deposited at t1
At+1 : Sum of assets deposited at t1 and t2 m˜t+1 : Money withdrawn at t2
money to trade at t2. Banks thus funnel resources from households to debtors and money
from the central bank to households.
At t1, a bank offers a one-period contract to households.
13 This contract is a portfolio
that comprises an illiquid and a liquid asset (money) and specifies the overall amount
of household investment At+1 (in equilibrium it is sufficient to specify the sum of assets
deposited at t1 and at t2) and the real rate of return rt+1. The bank also provides households
with checks and a debit card, so that up to Mt+1 units of money can be withdrawn at t2.
A portfolio thus consists of mt+1 liquid assets and of At+1 −mt+1 illiquid assets.
Once the contract is signed, the bank is obliged to fulfill the contract in any case. The
bank chooses the contract and the number of bonds to maximize profits.
Money is provided by the central bank through open market operations, where bonds
which pay an interest rate Rt are traded for non-interest-bearing fiat money. Following
the literature, I assume that the central bank can implement and control its interest rate
target R for the bond market. Profits Rt−1−1
pit
Et−1m˜t accrue at t1 and are transferred to the
household at t1.
13The linearity of preferences implies (shown below) that decisions at t do not affect decisions at t+ 1.
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The rest of the government has a rather passive role. Bt+1 bonds are issued every
period t and lump-sum taxes Rt−1
pit
Bt−Bt+1 are levied to balance the budget. The amount
of bonds Bt+1 is exogenous and bonds are bought by either commercial banks or households,
Bt+1 = B
B
t+1+B
H
t+1. Central and private banks’ profits are transferred to households directly
at t1.
2.2 A First Analysis
In an equilibrium, the flow of money during a time period is as follows. At t1, money starts
in the central bank who trades it for bonds to the commercial bank. At t2, households who
want to consume (c2t > 0) withdraw money from their account. Finally firms collect the
money they obtain for selling goods at t2 and transfer it, as part of workers’ wage income,
to their workers’ bank accounts to earn an interest rate r at the end of the period t2. The
commercial bank then carries the money to the next period. All other transactions are
conducted without money.
A household, endowed with Wt units of wealth, consumes c
1
t = Wt−χt ·At+1−BHt+1 at
t1 and c
2
t = χt · m˜t at t2. At t1 it derives expected lifetime utility
Vt(Wt) := c
1
t + Etu(c
2
t ) + βEtθt+1Vt+1(Wt+1) (7)
= Wt − χt(At+1 − Etu(m˜t+1))−BHt+1 + βEtθt+1Vt+1(Wt+1), (8)
where Wt evolves according to (3) and Etu(c
2
t ) = Etu(m˜t+1) = p·u(m˜t+1(θ))+p·u(m˜t+1(θ)).
At t2, the household chooses how much money m˜t+1(θt) to withdraw from the account
to spend on consumption to maximize utility u(cdt ) + βθtEt2Vt+1.
At t1, the household chooses χt and B
H
t+1 to maximize Vt(Wt).
To maximize profits, the bank offers a contract that grants the household not more than
its reservation utility V ot in all periods. The reservation utility equals Vt, from equation
(8), when no contract is signed with the bank (χt = 0):
V ot (Wt) = Wt −BHt+1 + βEtθt+1Vt+1(Rt/pit+1BHt+1 + wt+1 + Tt+1) (9)
At date t, the household knows that at date t+1 it will not receive more than its reservation
9
utility. Vt can thus be rewritten by plugging in V
o
t+1 for Vt+1 into (8):
Vt(Wt) = c
1
t + Etu(c
2
t ) + βEtθt+1{Wt+1(χt = 1)−BHt+2}
+ β2Etθt+1θt+2Vt+2(Rt+2/pit+2B
H
t+2 + wt+2 + Tt+2)},
where Wt+1(χt) is the wealth level at t+1 conditional on the choice χt to accept the bank’s
contract in period t.
V ot can also be rewritten by substituting V
o
t+1 for Vt+1:
V ot (Wt) = Wt −BHt+1 + βEtθt+1{Wt+1(χt = 0)−BHt+2}
+ β2Etθt+1θt+2Vt+2(Rt+1/pit+2B
H
t+2 + wt+2 + Tt+2)}
The fact that Vt is linear in Wt+1 simplifies the analysis substantially. Any two contracts
with different stipulated repayments in t+1 offered by the bank in t, change Vt+1 by exactly
this difference in repayments. In particular, periods later than t+ 1 do not affect Vt − V 0t .
Therefore, the bank’s problem at date t has to take into account periods t and t + 1 only.
A profit-maximizing portfolio (At+1,mt+1, rt+1) gives the household its reservation utility
if
Vt(Wt)− V ot (Wt) = 0
⇔ (10)
−At+1 + p{u(m˜t+1(θ)) + βθ(rt(At+1 − m˜t+1(θ))}+ p{u(m˜t+1(θ)) + βθ(rt(At+1 − m˜t+1(θ))} = 0
If all households accept the same contract (At+1,mt+1, rt) at t1, then, in equilibrium, low
shock agents will withdraw m˜t+1(θ) units of real money and high shock agents will withdraw
m˜t+1(θ) units of real money. The bank therefore needs Etm˜t+1 = p · m˜t+1(θ) + p · m˜t+1(θ)
units of real money to meet all requirements. Households deposit A1t+1 = At+1 − Etm˜t+1
at t1 and Etm˜t+1 = wtLt2 at t2. The bank buys B
B
t+1 = A
1
t+1 bonds, but trades Etm˜t+1 of
them in an open market operation for money. Only BBt+1 − p · m˜t(θ) − p · m˜t+1(θ) bonds
earn the return Rt.
14
14This acquisition of money through open market operations is equivalent to borrowing money at an
interest rate R.
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The function r(A,m) is defined as solving (10) for r and is thus the lowest interest rate
such that the household saves At+1 −mt+1 in illiquid assets and mt in liquid assets. The
repayment in t+ 1 then equals C(At+1,mt+1) = r(At+1,mt+1) · (At+1 − Etm˜t+1).
The bank’s problem, which is to choose a profit-maximizing contract (At+1,mt+1), can
now be formulated. The bank gets revenue from buying government bonds at an interest
rate of Rt. Money is acquired through open market operations from the central bank.
Finally, the bank has to pay Pt+1C(At+1,mt+1) to its customers. The bank chooses (At+1 =
BBt+1 + Etm˜t+1, B
B
t+1,mt+1) to maximize (nominal) profits:
RtPtB
B
t+1 − (Rt − 1)Pt(p · m˜t+1(θ) + p · m˜t+1(θ))− Pt+1C(At+1,mt), (11)
such that the household can afford it:
A1t+1 = At+1 − Etm˜t+1 ≤ Wt −BHt+1. (12)
I adjust labor productivity z to ensure that this constraint is never binding. This preserves
the linear structure of the model, which is needed for tractability. All households then sign
the same contract, independent of their individual shock in the preceding periods. I can
thus identify all variables with their aggregate counterparts.
An equilibrium is a sequence of prices r, w, R and P , together with bond holdings
BH and BB, allocations c1, c2 L1, L2, m and T and decisions χ and m˜ such that the
households maximize utility, banks maximize profits, the government and the household
budget constraint hold and the bond market, the money market and the goods market
clearing conditions are satisfied.
3 Interest Rates, Money and Inflation: Theoretical
Results
In this Section, I derive some theoretical results in a simplified version of the model. In par-
ticular, I show that nominal interest rates and inflation do not move one-for-one, although
prices are flexible.
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3.1 Characterizing Equilibrium
In this section I assume that preferences at t2 are linear:
15
u(c2t ) = c
2
t , (13)
which allows me to explicitly solve for the equilibrium. I assume that this equilibrium is
interior and I will provide a sufficient condition for this assumption later.
I first solve for the optimal portfolio offered by the bank. A necessary condition for an
equilibrium is R/piβ ≤ 1, since R/piβ > 1 would imply an infinite demand for bonds. Thus
I assume and verify later that R/piβ < 1 holds in equilibrium, i.e that it is consistent with
the bank’s problem. In particular, households do not hold bonds themselves BH = 0.16
Linear utility implies that a simple withdrawal rule m˜ at t2 is optimal. In the case of a
low shock, the maximum amount of money is withdrawn m˜t(θ) = mt and βrt+1θ is smaller
than one. Assumption 1 below ensures that for the optimal contract βrt+1θ > 1, and thus
m˜(θ) = 0 holds. The bank then buys all bonds BB = Bt = B and trades pm of them for
money, such that BB − pm = B − pm bonds earn an interest rate of R.
This all-or-nothing withdrawal rule allows me to solve equation (10) for r(B,m) :=
r(A − pm,m) and C(B,m) = r(B,m) · B, where both r and C are expressed in terms of
B = BB and m. Define γ = p · (1− θ).17
r(B,m) =
1
β
1
1 + γm
B
(14)
C(B,m) =
1
β
B
1 + γm
B
(15)
The bank’s optimal plan is given as a solution to first order conditions since the cost
function is (weakly) convex.
15To ensure an interior solution, the subsequent analysis with linear utility should be considered as a
limiting case of a specification with strictly concave utility, for example when u(c) = cδ and δ → 1.
16That households do not buy bonds by themselves is not a special feature of a model with linear utility.
Private banks always find it advantageous that households save with banks only. In case households are
active in the bond market, banks will bid up the real price of bonds and may improve the conditions of
agents’ contracts until no agent is active in the bond market anymore.
17If β = 1, γ is the percentage utility gain (in consumption equivalents) of making consumption state-
contingent.
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Lemma 1 C(B,m) = B
1+γm
B
is a convex function.
Households follow a simple strategy: They always accept the contract (χ = 1) and do
not buy bonds (BHt = 0).
Given a sequence of (rationally expected) Rt, an equilibrium is determined once the
amount of money mt and the inflation rate pit are known.
18 An interior equilibrium (mt, pit)
solves the bank’s first order conditions:
CB(B,mt) · pit+1 = Rt+1 (16)
Cm(B,mt) · pit+1 = p(1−Rt+1). (17)
I denote by mt(R, . . .), pit(R, . . .) the unique solution to (16) and (17).
Obtaining an explicit solution for the inflation rate is the crucial step in solving for an
equilibrium. The next proposition accomplishes this.
Proposition 1 The inflation rate equals
pit = β
(Rtγ + p · (Rt − 1))2
4pγ(Rt − 1) (18)
Given this explicit expression for the inflation rate, mt can be determined:
mt =
1
2
(
Rt+1
p(Rt+1 − 1) −
1
γ
) ·B (19)
Money will be held in equilibrium (mt > 0) if the marginal value −Cm(B,m = 0)
exceeds the marginal costs p · (R− 1)/(pi(m = 0)) for the bank. This holds if
γ >
βp(R− 1)
pi(m = 0)
(20)
⇔ γ > p · (R− 1)
R
(21)
18Sargent and Wallace (1975) and Woodford (2003) point out that an exogenous sequence of interest
rates can lead to (local) indeterminacy (there is a continuum of other equilibria which are arbitrarily close
to a given equilibrium). However, following the arguments in Woodford (2003), it is easy to show that the
following interest rate rule renders pit and mt a determinate equilibrium: R˜t = Rt + α | p˜it − pit |, for a
large α, where p˜it is the inflation rate in a (potentially) different equilibrium.
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I also make an assumption that liquidity is too expensive to be given to both low and
high types. Otherwise there would be no liquidity premium, i.e. the real interest rate paid
to households r and the real return banks earn, R/pi, would coincide, which is rejected by
the data. The assumption states that R has to be high enough so that liquidity is low
enough and therefore r is high enough.
Assumption 1
R >
p(1− p+ 2γ)
p− p2 − γ + 3pγ , (22)
which is equivalent to βrt+1θ =
2p(R−1)
γR+p(R−1) ·
1+γ−p
1−p > 1.
With this assumption, the following proposition can be proved.
Proposition 2 The sequence (mt(R, . . .), pit(R, . . .)) is the unique equilibrium. Rt/pitβ < 1
for all t.
3.2 Results
I can now develop the links between monetary policy, modeled as changes in nominal
interest rates, real interest rates and inflation in the simplified version of the model with
linear utility. The same mechanism will work in the general case in Section 4.
Banks provide households with liquidity since a more liquid portfolio makes agents
willing to accept a lower return r on their savings. The optimal provision of liquidity
balances the banks’ benefit from lowering repayments (r ·B) and the banks’ costs of lending
money, which is proportional to R− 1.
A tightening of monetary policy (a higher R) increases the bank’s costs of borrowing
money from the central bank, but makes it more attractive to invest in the asset market.
This leads to a swap of liquid for illiquid assets. Households then hold a less liquid portfolio
(m
B
is lower), but receive a higher real deposit rate, which reflects a higher liquidity premium
( 1
1+γm
B
). This increase in bank’s costs then prevents nominal interest rates and inflation
from moving one-for-one.
For a given level of R, equations (16) and (17) determine the two endogenous variables
14
pi and x = m
B
(CB and Cm are functions of x only). To obtain a graphical illustration, both
equations are solved for pi as a function of R and x:
piBM(R, x) =
R
CB(x)
=
Rβ(1 + γx)2
1 + 2γx
(23)
piMM(R, x) =
p(1−R)
Cm(x)
=
p(1−R)β(1 + γx)2
−γ , (24)
where piBM is the solution to the BondMarket equation (16) and piMM is the solution to the
MoneyMarket equation (17). Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration. The equilibrium
is located at point Y = (xY , piY ), where the two solid lines intersect. piBM slopes upward
since a higher amount of liquidity x = m
B
lowers r, the real interest rate households receive
on their bank deposits. For a given R, the inflation rate then has to be higher for the bond
market to be in equilibrium. The piMM curve slopes upward since the cost function C is
convex.
Exogenous changes in R reveal further interesting properties of the model, which turn
out to be crucial to match the data. The dashed lines in Figure 1 show the two curves after
an increase in R to Rˆ. The piMM curve is shifted to the left since, for a fixed level of the
inflation rate, a higher R leads to a less liquid portfolio (a lower x). The piBM curve is also
shifted to the left since, for a fixed level of x, a higher R leads to a higher inflation rate.
The next two propositions prove that these effects of changes in R on x and r also
hold in equilibrium, as suggested by the intersection of the two dashed curves in point
Z = (xZ , piZ) in Figure 1. First, there is a nominal liquidity effect. An increase in nominal
interest rates leads to a decrease in money (more precisely liquidity) demand.
Proposition 3 An increase in Rt decreases
mt+1
B
.
This property, together with the result that a higher x leads to a lower r, implies a real
liquidity effect: A higher level of nominal interest rates increases the real return on de-
posits r.
Proposition 4 An increase in Rt increases rt.
Whereas propositions 3 and 4 hold in general, several properties of Figure 1 do not. The
slope of the BM curve is not necessarily steeper than the MM curve and the location of
15
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Figure 1: Equilibrium of the model for two different levels of nominal interest rates, R and
Rˆ.
the equilibrium Y also depends on parameters.
Increasing γ makes the BM curve steeper. In a special case of the model, when γ
approaches 0, the BM curve is horizontal. In this case, there is no role for liquidity. A
one percent increase in R leads to a one percent increase in pi ∼ Rβ and leaves liquidity
unaffected. In terms of these implications, the model with γ close to 0 is then equivalent
to a basic Cash-in-Advance model with a binding CIA constraint.
The location of the equilibrium at point Z in Figure 1 suggests that an increase in R
implies an increase in pi and a drop in x. Figure 2, however, shows that the inflation rate
can also decrease in response to an increase in R. For this to be the case, the value of
liquidity, which is proportional to γ, has to be sufficiently high relative to its costs, which
are proportional to p(R − 1). The next proposition characterizes the response of inflation
to changes in nominal interest rates.
Proposition 5 At an interior solution (m > 0), the elasticity of inflation with respect to
nominal interest rates is smaller than 1:
pi,R =
∂pi
∂R
R
pi
< 1. (25)
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Figure 2: Equilibrium of the model for two different levels of nominal interest rates, R and
Rˆ.
If, in addition, R <
p+2γ
p+γ
, then an increase in R decreases pi.
In a CIA model with a binding CIA constraint, pi,R = 1. Not surprisingly, this elasticity
becomes smaller or even negative if liquidity is sufficiently important. The condition in
proposition 5 states that this is the case if γ is high and p and R are low enough.
An implication of this result is that pi,R < 0 if nominal interest rates are low enough,
so that the market is liquid enough. The next proposition provides a generalization of this
result.
Proposition 6 The inflation rate pi is a convex function of R. The response of pi to an
increase in R is the larger the higher is R.
In this section, I have established several properties of the model, which are crucial to
explain the data. An increase in nominal interest rates leads to a decrease in money
demand and a higher real return on deposits. In addition, there is no perfect co-movement
of inflation and nominal interest rates (pi,R < 0).
In the next section, I quantify a more general version of the model to assess whether
the model can simultaneously account for the data.
17
4 Interest Rate, Money and Inflation: A Quantitative
Assessment
For illustrative purposes, I used a simplified model in the previous section, which provides
a closed form solution. In this section, I add some elements of generality to the model,
which improve the model’s ability to match the data. Before I turn to the description of
the data and the estimation, I first describe how the model is generalized.
The linear utility specification at t2 implies an interest rate elasticity of money that is
far too high for a realistic ratio of liquid to illiquid assets. I therefore assume utility at t2
u(c2t ) to be strictly concave.
Utility is still linear at t1, so that the model is still tractable. The heterogeneity in wealth
does not matter, banks at t take into account periods t and t+ 1 only and offer a contract
(A,m, r) that makes agents indifferent between acceptance and rejection. R/pi · β > 1 is
again no equilibrium and households do not hold any bonds (BH = 0). What changes is
the withdrawal rule at t2. In equilibrium, low types still withdraw all liquid assets, but
high types withdraw a positive amount of money. This results in an implicit solution19 for
the real interest rate paid on deposits:
r(B,m) =
1
β
B + p · [m˜(θ)− u(m˜(θ))] + p · [m˜(θ)− u(m˜(θ))]
B + p · (θ − 1) · (m− m˜(θ)) (26)
The cost function then equals
C(B,m) = r(B,m) ·B (27)
Furthermore, I take into account that there are substantial non-interest incomes and
expenses, such as managing costs, fee income and valuation gains.20 For the bank’s decision,
it is only relevant what fraction of these incomes and expenses is marginal, i.e. changes
with the amount of assets. But this fraction is unobservable. I therefore capture marginal
19It is an implicit solution because m˜ depends on r.
20In the year 2000 all FDIC-insured commercial banks had non-interest income of 154.2 billion $ and
noninterest expenses of 216.8 billion $. Noninterest income and expenses are thus a large fraction of total
income since interest income equaled 428.1 billion $ and interest expenses equaled 224.6 billion $.
18
incomes and expenses through a function c(B).21
Finally, I allow the velocity at t2 to be different from one.
22 Households spend pm˜(θ) +
pm˜(θ) at t2, but the bank has to hold v(pm˜(θ) + pm˜(θ)) only, where v is smaller than 1
and describes how fast money ‘circulates’ at t2. The velocity at t2 then equals 1/v.
23 I also
allowed for Cournot competition (in a previous version), but it turns out that a monopoly
describes the data best. With all the added features, the first order conditions read as:
R = pi · rB(B,m)B + pi · r(B,m) + pic′(B) (28)
p(1−R)v = pirm(B,m)B. (29)
4.1 Data
There is a well documented structural change in the U.S. economy in the first half of the
1980s.24 Stock and Watson (2002) suggest that financial market reforms embodied in the
Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982 could be causal.
Since I want to avoid too much overlap with this period of substantial changes in the
financial sector, my sample starts in 1984 and then comprises the years 1984-2005.
The model provides some guidance on how to map the assets, termed liquid and illiquid
for convenience, to the data. These assets should be held through institutions that provide
21In a previous version, I also allowed for a cost to manage m, but the cost function for m was virtually
zero in any estimation.
22Velocity in the whole economy equals PtGNPtmt , which depends on the nominal interest rate. In partic-
ular, it is not constant and not equal to one.
23Another feature that could be added is more competition in the banking sector. Some degree of
monopoly power is useful since otherwise the whole difference between real deposit returns and banks’ real
return on assets is attributed to liquidity preferences only. How households value the liquidity provided by
banks is measured, taking into account monopoly rents, through agents’ willingness to accept an interest
rate below the market return. Insurance against uncertainty at t2 is orthogonal to potential uncertainty
in the centralized (unemployment insurance, health, car, etc.). Banks provide a certain type of insurance
and households are paying a price that reflects their valuation of this specific insurance.
24Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) were the first to point this out. A
detailed discussion and further references can be found in Blanchard and Simon (2001) and Stock and
Watson (2002).
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Figure 3: Nominal bank return R and liquidity m
A
households with cash or deposits, that makes these institutions subject to supervision by the
FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation). I therefore consider data on commercial
banks and savings institutions, which are taken from the Federal Reserve Database25 and
the FDIC26.
The distinguishing feature of liquid assets in the model is that they have zero maturity.
The counterpart of liquid assets in the data thus includes M1, the monetary aggregate
usually used for highly liquid assets, e.g. in Lucas (2000). I add saving deposits, which
both have zero maturity and have the feature that they pay some interest and cash can be
withdrawn without prior notice.
The distinguishing feature of illiquid assets is that they have non-zero maturity. Money
can be withdrawn only after some time has elapsed. I therefore choose small and large time
deposits as illiquid assets in the data.
The central bank controls a short-term nominal interest rate, which in this model cor-
responds to the return on all assets. Thus R should equal the nominal return on banks’
25URL: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2 and http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases.
26URL: http://www.fdic.gov.
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assets. Data on these are available from the FDIC, but only at an annual frequency. I
therefore cannot use the correct measure directly. Instead, I follow the literature on money
demand (e.g. Lucas (2000)) and consider a short-term interest rate.27 I then adjust the
mean of this short-term rate to match the nominal return on banks’ assets, which is 1.76%
per quarter (the real return is 1.14%). This requires adding 0.0053 to the short-term inter-
est rate series. The correlation between my measure (annualized) and the correct measure
from the FDIC is 0.938. The procedure thus seems to be fairly reliable. The only substan-
tial difference in the two time series is that the FDIC measure has no spike in 1995. Figure
3 shows the time series of the (adjusted) nominal interest rate and of the ratio of liquid
to illiquid assets; two time series which are strongly negatively correlated in the model
(proposition 3). Figure 3 confirms this model prediction.
The bank pays X := r(A − pm˜t(θ) − pm˜t(θ)) to households in every period. The
implicit real interest r in the model then equals the average real interest rate paid to
households, X
A−pm˜t(θ)−pm˜t(θ) . Fortunately, there are publicly available data on the average
return on household deposits. The St. Louis Fed provides a times series, M2Own, which is
a weighted average of interest rates, paid on assets in M2. This is, to my knowledge, the
most reliable measure of deposit returns available. I thus use this average return on M2
(M2Own) as my measure of the average nominal return on deposits. To obtain a measure
of the real return on deposits, I subtract inflation expectations from the Survey of Profes-
sional Forecasters, provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.28 The (ex-post)
inflation rate is computed from the GDP deflator. Figure 4 shows the nominal quarterly
return on banks’ assets and the real quarterly return on deposits. The model predicts a
positive correlation between these two series (proposition 4) and Figure 4 again confirms
this prediction.
27Secondary Market Rate of a six-month Treasury bill.
28Available at http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/spf/spfshortlong.html.
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deposits r
22
4.2 Estimation
I now estimate the model using the simulated method of moments. The model time period
is a quarter.29 The utility derived from consumption at t2 is assumed to be:
u(c2) = κ · (c2)δ. (30)
The income/cost function c(B) is assumed to be linear:
c(B) = αB + c, (31)
where c ∼ N(0, σ2c ). In addition to costs being stochastic, there is an interest rate reaction
function which describes monetary policy:
log(Rt) = R + ρ1(log(Rt−1)−R) + ρ2(log(Rt−2)−R) + R (32)
where R is the mean of log(R) and  ∼ N(0, σ2R). To render the exercise comparable to
Hodrick et al. (1991), the monetary policy rule does not depend on variables other than R.
Including more lags than two does not change the dynamics of the interest rate rule in the
model. Including just one lag leads to a statistically significantly autocorrelated residual
R. The amount of assets A is assumed to be constant at the level A.
Thirteen parameters have to be determined: the time preference rate β, the probability
of a low shock p, the value of liquidity γ, the velocity parameter v, the two utility parameters
κ and δ, the income/cost function parameter α, the five parameters describing the evolution
of R, A and c: ρ1, ρ2, σR, σc and A and the level of productivity z.
I normalize the level of the data series At to be one in the third quarter of 1984 and then
set A in the model equal to 1.199, the mean of this normalized series. The productivity
parameter z is chosen to match the velocity of liquid assets, which equals 2.590 in the
data. I also choose to match the following seven statistics: The mean levels of the inflation
rate, E(log(pi)) = 0.6212%, of the real deposit return, E(log(r)) = 0.139%, and of the
ratio of liquid assets to all assets, E(log(m
A
)) = −0.445; the standard deviations of the
29This is the standard choice in business cycle models. A shorter period length - a month or a week -
which may render the CIA constraint more appealing, does not change the results of this paper.
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inflation rate, σlog(pi) = 0.00176, of the real deposit return, σlog(r) = 0.000938, and of
m
A
,
σlog(m
A
) = 0.0338 (all HP-filtered with smoothing parameter 1600); two elasticities computed
from the following two regressions of m
A
on R:
log(
m
A
) = α0 + m
A
,R log(R), (33)
and of r on m
A
:
log(r) = β0 + r,m
A
log(
m
A
). (34)
I find m
A
,R = −19.293 and r,m
A
= −0.0214.
These statistics, reported in Table 2, quantify the key mechanisms of the model. m
A
,R
and m
A
describe money demand and r,m
A
describes households’ willingness to substitute
liquidity for a lower real return on their deposits. Targeting not only r,m
A
, but also σlog(r)
takes into account that r is less volatile than the real return on bonds. The three remaining
targets - the means of pi, r and m
A
- are natural choices as they make sure that the model
replicates some averages in the data.
Table 3 shows the estimated parameter values that generate the best fit of the model
with respect to the targets specified above. The remaining parameter values describing the
interest rate rule, the average level of A and z are contained in Table 4. The second column
of Table 2 describes the performance of the model in matching the targets. The targets
are hit very well what can be considered a first success of the model. Hodrick et al. (1991)
find that many moments cannot be replicated in the model one at a time, whereas here all
targets are matched simultaneously for one set of parameters.
Although the parameters are chosen to match all targets simultaneously, some param-
eters can be assigned to specific targets. The cost parameter α makes sure that the model
replicates the mean of inflation in the model and σc does the same for the volatility of
inflation. The remaining model parameters are then chosen to match real targets only. In
particular, matching the co-movement of inflation with other variables is not part of the
estimation, but provides a way to assess the success of the model. The policy function
is found to be quite persistent with ρ1 larger than one, reflecting the fact that changes
in monetary policy are followed by changes into the same direction (increases by further
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Table 2: Matching the Estimation Targets.
Target Value
Data Model
1. Mean inflation, E(log(pi)), 0.622 % 0.631 %
2. Mean real deposit return , E(log(r)), 0.139 % 0.136 %
3. Mean fraction of liquid assets E(log(m
A
)), -0.445 -0.443
4. S.d. of inflation, Std(log(pi)), 0.176 % 0.169 %
5. S.d. of real deposit return , Std(log(r)), 0.122 % 0.089 %
6. S.d. of fraction of liquid assets Std(log(m
A
)), 3.384 % 3.675 %
7. Elasticity of r w.r.t. m
A
, r,m
A
, -19.293 -18.553
8. Elasticity of m
A
w.r.t. R, m
A
,R, -0.0214 -0.0231
Note - Column 2 (”Model“) is based on the parameter estimates described
in Tables 3 and 4.
increases and decreases by further decreases). It is this persistency of the interest rate
rule that leads to a strong co-movement of nominal variables in standard models. Finally,
the parameters can be used to compute the implied volatility of consumption at t2, which
equals 9% in percentage terms. This number seems reasonable, but is smaller than the
20 − 25% reported in Telyukova (2007), who measures the volatility of cash goods in the
Consumption Expenditure Survey. But this is expected since, first, there is measurement
error in the data and, second, not all cash good smoothing is done through a bank and bank
instruments (deposits, checks, . . . ). Since the model picks up only this type of insurance,
finding this smaller number (9%) is comforting.
A first test of the model is to explore whether the model can replicate the data. I therefore
feed the time series of Rt and At, as observed in the data between the first quarter of 1984
and the fourth quarter of 2005, into the model. I then compute the model predictions for
the share of liquid assets m
A
and the real interest rate paid on deposits r and compare them
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Table 3: Parameter Estimates
p γ β v κ δ α σc
0.865 0.858 0.973 0.447 0.052 0.927 -0.002 0.178 %
Table 4: Parameter Estimates
ρ1 ρ2 σR A z
1.217 -0.333 0.118 % 1.199 1.994
with their counterparts in the data. Figures 5, 6 and 7 show the result for m
A
, m and r.
The three figures demonstrate that the model replicates the data very well, although only
a small number of targets and parameters is used.30
A prerequisite for a good match between the model and the data is that there is no
perfect co-movement between inflation and nominal interest rates. To assess the size of
liquidity effects, I compute the nominal interest rate elasticity of inflation. To this end, I
simulate the model with different values for the mean level of R and compute the average
inflation rate. Figure 8 shows the result, where R is on the x-axis and the mean inflation
rate is on the y-axis. The average interest rate elasticity of inflation is 0.38, which suggests
that the model can potentially match several facts in the data, such as the low correlation of
inflation and nominal interest rates, but also the negative correlation of the money growth
rate and the nominal interest rate. Figure 8 also shows that the elasticity is higher if
30The two figures reveal two minor problems. There is a lag between the data on money and the model
predictions what suggests that some form of portfolio adjustment costs would be helpful to explain the
data. Second, the largest deviation between the data and the model occurs in the year 1995, which is
exactly the year in which my measure of banks’ return differs from the correct FDIC measure.
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Figure 6: Money m: data and model
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Figure 7: Real deposit returns r: data and model
nominal interest rates are higher and can be become negative for low values of R, confirming
proposition 6.
4.3 Simulation
In this section, I perform an exercise similar to that in Hodrick et al. (1991). I simulate
the model to generate predictions for the endogenous variables. I then compare statistics
computed from the model-generated data with sample statistics computed from quarterly
U.S. time series.
I examine the following statistics: the standard deviation of inflation, of velocity and
of the real return on deposits. I also consider the means of the inflation rate, of the real
return on deposits and of velocity; I calculate the correlations of inflation with nominal
interest rates, with the real return on bonds, with the real return on deposits, with velocity
and with the money growth rate. I also compute the correlation of nominal interest rates
with velocity and with the nominal money growth rate and the correlation of velocity and
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the nominal money growth rate.31
To simulate the model, I use a pseudo-random number generator to calculate the two
shocks R and c at each point in time. Using the policy rule (32), I first compute Rt (I set
R2 = R1 = R) and then pit, mt and rt. Since utility is linear, I can solve for the equilibrium
in each period separately, once Rt is known. I throw away the first 1000 “quarters” and
then generate 88 data points , corresponding to quarterly data from 1984 to 2005. I repeat
this 10000 times to generate the means and standard deviations of the model-generated
data. Table 5 shows the results for the statistics computed from the simulated data and
the sample statistics from U.S. data, which were described in Sub-section 4.1. The first
eight statistics replicate the finding that the eight targets are hit very well. The remaining
ten statistics are not targeted in the estimation and can thus be used to further assess the
quantitative performance of the model.
The main conclusion from the simulation is that the model statistics are close to
their counterparts in the data. In particular, the correlation of inflation with various other
variables is remarkably close. The low correlation of inflation and nominal interest is
replicated by the model as well as the negative correlation of inflation and nominal money
growth rate. Another aspect, the correlation of inflation and the real interest rate has
attracted a lot of attention since other models fail along this dimension (Hodrick et al.
(1991)). Table 5, however, shows that this is not the case here. The correlation with both
real returns - on bonds and on deposits - is in line with the data. The co-movement of
the money growth rate with the nominal interest rate and with velocity is also of the same
magnitude as it is in the data. Finally, the correlation of velocity and nominal interest rates
is hit almost perfectly in the simulation. Interestingly, the model performs quantitatively
well although utility at t1 is linear. The potential concern that linear utility limits the
model’s ability to replicate the data is thus not warranted, at least not for the statistics
considered here.
Although the model does very well in matching all 18 statistics, there are two key
statistics. The correlation of inflation and nominal interest rates (row 11) and the stable
31All variables are logged before filtering with the HP-filter. All correlations are contemporaneous.
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Table 5: Simulation Results.
Statistic Value
Data Model
1. Mean inflation, E(log(pi)), 0.622 % 0.631 %
(0.02 %)
2. Mean real deposit return , E(log(r)), 0.139 % 0.136 %
(0.019 %)
3. Mean fraction of liquid assets E(log(m
A
)), -0.445 -0.443
(0.009)
4. S.d. of inflation, Std(log(pi)), 0.176 % 0.169 %
(0.012 %)
5. S.d. of real deposit return , Std(log(r)), 0.122 % 0.089 %
(0.015 %)
6. S.d. of fraction of liquid assets Std(log(m
A
)), 3.383 % 3.675 %
(0.555 %)
7. Elasticity of r w.r.t. m
A
, r,m
A
, -0.0214 -0.0230
(0.001)
8. Elasticity of m
A
w.r.t. R, m
A
,R, -19.293 -18.553
(0.759)
9. Mean velocity, E(log( z
m
)), 0.948 0.952
(0.009)
10. S.d. of velocity Std(log( z
m
)), 3.554 % 3.675 %
(0.014 %)
11. Correlation of inflation and nominal interest rate, 0.309 0.365
(0.108)
12. Correlation of inflation and nominal money growth rate , -0.178 -0.026
(0.095)
13. Correlation of inflation and real deposit return, 0.148 0.359
(0.106)
14. Correlation of inflation and real bond return, 0.213 0.262
(0.106)
15. Correlation of inflation and velocity, 0.263 0.430
(0.100)
16. Correlation of nominal interest rate and nominal money growth rate, -0.501 -0.412
(0.067)
17. Correlation of nominal interest rate and velocity, 0.889 0.815
(0.046)
18. Correlation of nominal money growth rate and velocity, -0.260 -0.274
(0.046)
Note - Column 2 (”Model“) is based on the parameter estimates described in Tables 3 and 4. The lower part of
the Table (row 9 - row 18) describes statistics not targeted in the estimation. All correlations are contemporaneous.
The nominal money growth rate equals PtmtPt−1mt−1 . Bootstrapped standard errors from 10000 model simulations are
reported in parentheses. 31
money demand curve described in row 8 and row 17. The first property breaks the co-
movement between nominal interest rates and nominal variables (not only inflation, but
also the nominal money growth rate). The first and the second property together imply
that the inflation rate and real balances are negatively correlated. This correlation is strong
enough to lead to a negative correlation of inflation and the nominal money growth rate
(which is the sum of the real balance growth rate plus inflation).
5 Concluding Remarks
I have developed a model that extends the basic Cash-in-Advance (CIA) model. The key
new features of the model are that households face idiosyncratic shocks, which determine
their demand for liquidity, and that banks provide them with liquidity when they need it.
A key finding is that the model is characterized by strong liquidity effects: Changes in
real money (liquidity) holdings change the real interest rate on deposits. Qualitatively, this
feature is not new. In standard models where money enters the utility function, changes in
real balances also affect the real interest rate if the utility function is non-separable between
consumption and money. Quantitatively, however, the difference is substantial.
In my model, the elasticity of r with respect to m equals −0.023. Woodford (2003)
shows that a value of −0.02 does not change the quantitative implications in standard
new Keynesian models much. The reason is that in such models, a change in money
changes the marginal utility of consumption (because of non-separability) and thus affects
real interest rates through the Euler equation. For example, if money holdings go up 10%
today and in the next period, the marginal utility today and in the next period change by
the same amount and thus the real interest rate today remains unaffected. Since changes
in monetary policy are very persistent, this example explains much of what is going on in
the new Keynesian model.
In my model, by contrast, the real rate on deposits decreases today and in the next
period if money holdings go up 10% today and in the next period. In other words, the
level of real balances matters here, whereas first differences of real balances matter in NK
models.
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In the quantitative analysis, I show that these strong liquidity effects indeed imply
that the model predictions are close to their empirical counterparts. In particular, nominal
interest rates and inflation do not move one-for-one, although prices are flexible. This result
can potentially address a shortcoming of new Keynesian models, expressed in Hagedorn
(2006). In that paper, I compute the optimal path of nominal interest rates to implement
a lower inflation target. I find that nominal interest rates are uniformly lowered, whereas
central bankers’ conventional wisdom suggests the opposite: Nominal interest rate should be
increased to attain this goal (The Volcker disinflation is a good example). This inconsistency
can be traced back to the absence of strong liquidity effects in standard monetary models.
Since, by contrast, liquidity effects are strong here, adding some short-run frictions to the
model, such as sticky prices, is a promising avenue for future research.
Appendix
Derivation of the cost function
Given that m˜t(θ) = mt and m˜t(θ) = 0, the contract gives the household its reservation
utility (see equation 10) if (ignoring time indices)
−A+ p(m+ βθr(A−m) + pβθrA = 0
⇔ r = 1
β
A− pm
A− pθm =
1
β
B
B + p(1− θ)m
Thus
r(B,m) =
1
β
1
1 + γ ·m/B and
C(B,m) =
1
β
B
1 + γ ·m/B
Proof of Lemma 1 I first calculate second derivatives.
C22(B,m) =
1
β
2γ2
B · (1 + γm/B)3
C12(B,m) = C21(B,m) =
1
β
−2mγ2
B2 · (1 + γm/B)3
C11(B,m) =
1
β
2m2γ2
B3 · (1 + γm/B)3
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Since C22(B,m) · C11(B,m) − C12(B,m) · C21(B,m) = 0 and C11(B,m) > 0, the Hesse
matrix of C has a positive and a zero eigenvalue. Thus C is convex.
Proof of proposition 1 I first calculate the first derivatives of the cost function. All time
indices will be ignored.
CB(B,m) =
1
β
1 + 2γm/B
(1 + γm/B)2
(35)
Cm(B,m) =
1
β
−γ
(1 + γm/B)2
(36)
Equilibrium conditions 16 and 17 (the bank’s first order conditions) imply that
R
p(R− 1) =
CB
−Cm =
1 + 2γm/B
γ
and
R− p(R− 1)m/B) = piCB + piCmm/B) = pi
β
1
1 + γm/B
Solving the first equation for m/B and the second for pi results in:
m
B
=
1
2
(
R
p(R− 1) −
1
γ
) and
pi = β(1 + γ
m
B
) · (R− p(R− 1)m
B
)
Plugging m/B into the last equation proves the claim:
pi = β
1
4
(
γR
p(R− 1) + 1)(R +
p(R− 1)
γ
) (37)
= β
(Rγ + p · (R− 1))2
4pγ(R− 1) (38)
Proof of proposition 2
For (mt(R, . . .), pit(R, . . .)) to be an equilibrium, it remains to be shown that Rt/pitβ < 1
and βrθ > 1 (ex post verification). Equilibrium condition 16 says that
R
pi
= CB(B,m) (39)
Equation (35) in the proof of proposition 1 shows that R/piβ < 1 is equivalent to
1
β
1 + 2γm/B
(1 + γm/B)2
<
1
β
(40)
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The left-hand side is smaller than 1/β thus R/piβ < 1.
Since
r =
1
β
1
1 + γ ·m/B and (41)
m =
1
2
(
R
p(R− 1) −
1
γ
) ·B (42)
it follows that
r = 2
p(R− 1)
β(pR− p+ γR) (43)
As
θ =
1− p+ γ
1− p (44)
βrθ > 1 (45)
is (after some simple algebra) equivalent to
R >
p(1− p+ 2γ)
p− p2 − γ + 3pγ , (46)
what is exactly assumption 1.
Proof of propositions 3, 4, 5 and 6 Since I have derived an explicit solution for all
variables, the proof amounts to calculating derivatives. First I show that m/B is decreasing
in R (Proposition 3):
∂m/B
∂R
=
1
2
∂( R
p(R−1) − 1γ )
∂R
=
−1
4(R− 1)2p
< 0.
Since equation 14 implies that r is a decreasing function of m/B, r is increasing in R (which
proves proposition 4).
To prove proposition 5, I first compute the first derivative of pi with respect to R:
∂pi
∂R
= β
2(pR− p+Rγ)(p+ γ)(R− 1)− (pR− p+Rγ)2
4pγ(R− 1)2
=
β(γR + p(R− 1))(Rγ − 2γ + p(R− 1))
4pγ(R− 1)2
35
It follows that
pi,R =
∂pi
∂R
R
pi
=
R(Rγ − 2γ + p(R− 1))
(R− 1)(Rγ + p(R− 1))
Some simple algebra then shows that pi,R < 1 is equivalent to γR > p(R− 1), which again
is equivalent to m > 0.
Since
∂pi
∂R
< 0
⇔ Rγ − 2γ + p(R− 1) < 0
⇔ R < p+ 2γ
p+ γ
,
all claims in Proposition 5 are proved.
Computing the second derivative of pi, which equals
∂2pi
∂2R
=
βγ
2p(R− 1)3 > 0,
also proves Proposition 6.
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